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The Portuguese revolutionary process has been studied and analyzed both by historians and political 
scientists. Less attention has been paid to the long process of consolidation of the democratic regime, also 
crossed by contradictions and tensions. After two turbulent years the country began a process of 
consolidation of the democratic institutions. However, the role played by the military in the fall of the 
previous dictatorial regime and the fragility of the new democratic institutions, did not allow their immediate 
withdrawal from political life. The President of the Republic was a military and the political parties had 
agreed to maintain an unelected sovereign body: the Revolutionary Council. This paper presents some 
elements that help to understand the success of democratic consolidation in Portugal, revealing in particular 
that this process should not be interpreted as confrontation between democratic civilian parties and the 
military and that the subordination to the civil power can also be encouraged by the military itself. 
 




The Portuguese revolutionary process has been studied and analyzed both by 
historians and political scientists and is now well known1. Less attention has been paid 
to the long process of consolidation of the democratic regime, also crossed by 
contradictions and tensions, despite the success achieved in 1982, with the approval of 
the revision of the 1976 Constitution and the approval of the National Defense Act, two 
milestones of effective subordination of the military to the civil power2. 
After two turbulent years in which different pathways for the future of the political 
and institutional framework of Portugal clashed, the country began a process of 
consolidation of the democratic institutions delineated between 1975/1976. However, 
the role played by the military in the fall of the previous dictatorial regime, the Estado 
Novo, and the fragility of the new democratic institutions, did not allow their immediate 
withdrawal from political life. The President of the Republic was a military and the 
                                                          
* This communication is an adapted version of my article “To the barracks: the President, the military and 
democratic consolidation in Portugal (1976-1980)”, European Review of History: Revue européenne 
d’histoire, DOI: 1080/13507486.2016.1155541 
** Post-Doctoral Researcher, FCT grant 75787/2011. 
1 On the military’s role in this process and its antecedents see, for example: (Schmitter, 1975, 5-33); (Graham, 
1979, 221-256). 
2 We follow the periodization proposed by António Costa Pinto, who divided the Portuguese Democratization 
process in three phases: overthrow of the authoritarian regime (April 1974 to March 1975); revolutionary 
crisis (March 1975 to July 1976); democratic consolidation (July 1976 to 1982). (Pinto, 2001, 65-90). 
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political parties had agreed to maintain an unelected sovereign body: the Revolutionary 
Council, which would only be extinguished in 1982. 
In this paper I intend to analyze the role of the military, more concretely of the 
Revolutionary Council. Based on primary sources that only became available a few years 
ago, namely the Revolutionary Council files, I will present some elements that help to 
understand the success of democratic consolidation in Portugal, revealing in particular 
that this process should not be interpreted as confrontation between democratic civilian 
parties and the military and that the subordination to the civil power can also be 
encouraged by the military itself. 
 
The President and the Council of the Revolution 
Ramalho Eanes was elected President of the Republic, by direct universal suffrage, in 
June 1976. It was the culmination of a rapid rise that began when Eanes assumed the 
leadership of the group responsible for the victory of 25th November 1975 operations 
against the military left, which led him to the leadership of the army and then to the 
presidential race. 
During the electoral campaign he had the support of the most voted parties in the 
parliamentary elections held two months earlier (Socialist Party – PS; Popular 
Democratic Party – PPD and Social Democratic Centre – CDS) and also had significant 
support in the Armed Forces, especially in the most important branch, the Army. 
A year after the hot summer of 1975, which almost led the country to a civil war, 
Portugal had a Constitution, a President, an Assembly and a government. The 
revolutionary period was over, but now began another phase, the phase of democratic 
consolidation. The Constitution, approved in early April 1976, fulfilling what was agreed 
between the political parties and the military responsible for the former regime fall, 
established the existence of a sovereign body, the Revolutionary Council (RC), which 
besides working as a presidential council, should ensure compliance of the Constitution 
and the fidelity to the spirit of the Portuguese revolution. The Council also held exclusive 
competence to legislate on the organization, functioning and discipline of the Armed 
Forces, and was entitled to approve international treaties or agreements that involved 
the military affairs. Summarizing, the RC was the only ‘political and legislative body in 
military matters’. 
The RC was constituted by the President of the Republic, who chaired, the Chief of 
General Staff of the Armed Forces (CGS), the vice-Chief of General Staff, by the heads of 
the three branches of the military, and 14 officers (8 from the Army, 3 from the Navy, 3 
from the Air Force). Besides being the advisory body of the PR and the only body with 
political and legislative powers in military affairs, as guarantor of observance of the 
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Constitution, the RC should rule on the constitutionality of any diplomas before they 
were promulgated or signed and ensure the issuance of the necessary measures to 
implement the constitutional requirements by drawing up recommendations. The RC 
also had the power to assess the constitutionality of any published diplomas and to 
declare their unconstitutionality, and also had authority to rule on the appointment and 
dismissal of the Prime Minister and on the right of suspensive veto of the PR.  
To assist the RC in the assessment of constitutionality a Constitutional Commission 
was created. This commission was composed of: a RC member, as president and entitled 
a casting vote, four judges and four citizens of recognized merit3. The function of the 
Commission was to draw up opinions on the constitutionality of the diplomas that were 
going to be examined by the RC, but their opinions were not mandatory, which meant 
that the RC was not obliged to follow their recommendations.  
The Constitution gives wide powers to the military. Furthermore, the President was a 
military and we should also bear in mind that the President conciliated three types of 
legitimacy that gave him a high range of powers. Beyond the electoral legitimacy 
conferred by the vote, direct and universal, and the revolutionary legitimacy, which was 
conferred by the fact that, as PR, he presided over the RC, Eanes still had a functional 
legitimacy because he accumulated the presidency with the leadership of the Armed 
Forces4. A former presidential adviser argued later that these three types of legitimacy 
overlapped and balanced and that they did not have a leverage effect since, in his opinion, 
these powers could only be exercised in fullness in a national emergency, a situation that 
never happened5. While it is true that these powers have never been exercised in full 
power, their concentration would prove to be crucial in the democratic consolidation 
process. 
A month after the presidential election, Ramalho Eanes defended that he should take 
“temporarily” the head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces because in his opinion 
this was the way to ensure the restructuring of the Armed Forces6. However, this idea 
found some opposition in the military circles. For instance, Pinheiro de Azevedo, former 
Prime Minister and one of the presidential candidates defeated by Eanes, criticized this 
option, considering that it would be “very serious to provide the President of the Republic 
with military force” and the “power to appoint the chiefs of the General Staffs”7. Another 
defeated candidate, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, who had led the populist current of the 
MFA, and who continued to defend “a radical and revolutionary solution”, said that 
                                                          
3 The Portuguese Constitution. Available at:  
www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/content/files/crp1976.pdf (accessed August 20, 2015). 
4 This combination of three types of legitimacy was identified by Bruneau and Macleod, 1986,120. 
5 Aguiar, 1996, 1247-1248. 




Eanes could “became a dictator” due to the accumulation of functions8. Despite these 
criticisms, when on July 14, 1976, Ramalho Eanes took office as President, he also 
assumed the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces9. Five days later, 
Eanes appointed Rocha Vieira, an official very close to him10, as Chief of Staff of the Army 
(CSA). On that occasion, the President argued that the fundamental purpose of the army 
was to “ensure the democratic rule of law” and that the new Chief of Staff was the right 
person to prevent the politicization of the military. In turn, the new Chief advocated that 
an “united, strong and effective” army was one of the basic conditions for democratic 
life11.    
The decisive moment, that shows the importance of the convergence of the three types 
of legitimacy in Ramalho Eanes figure, manifested itself shortly afterwards, in early 
August 1976, when the President submitted a proposal to restructure the RC. 
With the argument that it was necessary to stabilize the Armed Forces and defend the 
RC from attacks and criticisms, Eanes maintainde that the board members who exercised 
military functions would have to choose to stay in the RC, only as counselors, or 
continued at the head of military commands. From this moment the accumulation of 
functions would be impossible, which meant that five of the eighteen RC members would 
have to choose between one of the options presented to them. Two of the counselors who 
were in this situation preferred to remain in their military commands and left the RC, 
the other three have opted for their seats as counselors, and for one of them, Vasco 
Lourenço, commander of the Lisbon Military Region, an exception was opened because 
it was considered that this command would have to be filled by a RC element, which 
allowed him to continue to exercise political functions, as a counselor, and military 
functions as commander of the Military Region12. 
These changes were not well received by all RC members. Two weeks before, one of 
the counselors had defended an opposite measure: that to face the attacks directed to the 
Council by various political forces and in order to give an answer “demonstrative of the 
strength and cohesion” of the RC, the counselors in command of military regions were 
awarded with the rank of general13. Other of the critics, would later claim that this 
solution had weakened the RC institutional weight as a political-military body, because 
this measure had cut the RC connection to the Armed Forces through the Council 
                                                          
8 Diário de Lisboa, 12-7-1976, p. 5. 
9 Appointed by the Revolutionary Council. Minutes of Meeting, 14-7-1976, The Council of the Revolution 
Archives, Reuniões, Actas, vol. 3, box 3, IAN/TT. 
10 Rocha Vieira was also one of the military responsible for the success of the November 25. 
11 Diário de Lisboa, 19-7-1976, p. 1 and 20. 
12 Minutes of Meeting, 11-8-1976, The Council of the Revolution Archives, Reuniões, Actas, vol. 3, box 3, 
IAN/TT. 




elements who held an effective command. In the opinion of this counselor, the solution 
advocated by the President aimed to isolate the RC of the military structure14.   
 
Different views on the role of the Revolutionary Council 
In fact, what was in question here were two distinct views on the RCs role in the 
process of democratic consolidation. On one side we find the President and the heads of 
the armed forces who advocated that separation of functions. On the other we find those 
who defended a greater involvement of the military in the conduction of the political 
destinies of the country, through an interventionist RC, able to utilize its maximum 
power, according to the functions that were constitutionally assigned to it. 
These divergences were noted on several occasions. Following the changes introduced 
in the RC and in the military commands motivated by the separation imposed by Eanes, 
one of the counselors, after having referred to the existence of divisions in the Armed 
Forces, said that “there was a feeling” that the administrative and bureaucratic 
machinery of the army was favoring ‘the conservative forces’ and chasing the military 
who had done the April 25. In his view this situation was creating two opposing camps, 
putting on one side the military who had made the coup, the “captains”, and on the other 
those who were not involved, the “colonels”15.  
Another sign of the existence of different views on the RC’s role in the new 
constitutional framework was given at the inaugural ceremony of the Constitutional 
Commission, chaired by Melo Antunes. This counselor, who had also played a key role in 
the fight against the more radical wing of the MFA in the hot summer of 1975, said that 
the Council of the Revolution was ‘the incarnation of the revolutionary spirit of the April 
25’ and that the Council could not “betray” this “primal urge” that had animated the 
captains of the Armed Forces Movement, arguing that the RC should not take a neutral 
position while “the struggle for the structural transformation of the society” persisted. 
But the President of the Republic, after criticizing those who considered themselves as 
the “exclusive defenders” of the Constitution and those who insinuated “the weaknesses 
of the new institutions to subvert them”, stressed that the Constitutional Commission 
was similar to the existing constitutional courts in other countries, and bucked the 
“military image” that some sectors sought to assign to the CC, noting that although 
headed by a military man, was comprised of jurists whose integrity was unquestioned16.   
On the third anniversary of April 25 the divergences about the role of the military and 
the Council of the Revolution in the Portuguese political life returned to be noticed. In 
                                                          
14 Rezola, 2012, 536. 
15 Minutes of Meeting, 22-9-1976, The Council of the Revolution Archives, Reuniões, Actas, vol. 3, box 3, 
IAN/TT. 
16 Diário de Lisboa, 3-11-1976, pp. 1-2. 
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an interview to the Hungarian news agency, the president of the Constitutional 
Commission noted that the Portuguese Constitution advocated the construction of a 
socialist society and that this aim could only be achieved through a real alliance between 
the left wing parties, political groups that are active on the left and “even the elements of 
the Armed Forces who were initially responsible for the coup of April 25 and that remain 
a very important ferment in the Portuguese Revolution”17. However, the official 
statement that marked the anniversary, which was approved by the majority of the RC, 
made no reference to socialism as a goal to achieve, reaffirming only that “the will of the 
Portuguese people freely expressed” was “the source of the legitimate power” with which 
the Armed Forces identified themselves18.    
This attitude of Melo Antunes was deeply debated by the RC. The newly appointed 
vice-Chief of the General Staff, also an officer very close to Eanes, said that if they were 
true, the statements of Melo Antunes contradicted the position taken by the Chief of the 
General Staff and himself. In fact, at the inauguration of the vice-Chief, which took place 
in early April 1977, Eanes said the Armed Forces should “ensure the full and permanent 
protection of the rights of the citizens” and “respect the objectives that only the people 
could set through their legitimate representatives”, reason which led him to argue that 
the military shouldn’t serve the parties but only the people they were are part of. On the 
same line, his deputy, argued that in the Armed Forces there was no left or right, because 
these “as parts of the political spectrum, are inherent to any democratic society” and the 
military was “the ultimate guarantor of the existence of the Portuguese society from left 
and from right” whose historic mission was “to ensure the survival of democracy”19. The 
president of the Constitutional Commission was then pressed to retreat and came 
publicly to state that his declarations only expressed his personal opinion and not the RC 
opinion20. 
The chiefs of staff did not limit themselves to making speeches about the need to 
prevent and combat the politicization within the Armed Forces. In April 1977 the RC 
approved the Code of Military Justice and the rules of Military Discipline, two important 
instruments for the restoration of discipline in the Armed Forces and to the 
strengthening of authority of the traditional hierarchy. In the political field “a rigorous 
political non-partisanship” to all military became a requirement21.   
The fractures inside the Council of the Revolution emerged on other occasions. For 
example, after the fall of the I Government, a minority executive of the Socialist Party, 
                                                          
17
 Diário de Lisboa, 25-4-1977, p. 15. 
18
 Minutes of Meeting, 25-4-1977, The Council of the Revolution Archives, Reuniões, Actas, vol. 4, box 5, 
IAN/TT. 
19
 Diário de Lisboa, 7-4-1977, p. 2. 
20
 Rezola, 2012, p. 581. 
21
 Rules of Military Discipline. Decree-Law nº 142/77. Diário da República, 1st series, nº 83, April 9, 1977. 
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one of the counselors who advocated a more interventionist stance of the RC, argued that 
the second pact only “formally” had been applied, since the RC had moved away “the 
Portuguese political life” and that departure had left the democracy “at the mercy of 
cyclical arrangements of political parties” that had led the country to a political 
impasse22. Later, the rejection by the parliamentary parties of the government of 
presidential initiative headed by an independent, placed once again the RC role as a 
sovereign body at the center of the discussion. Some counselors expressed regret that the 
role that the Armed Forces Movement had played in 1975 and 1976 could not be re-
implemented, because in their view the process did not have “its normal development” 
and the RC was not in a position to mediate anything. On the same occasion criticisms 
were also heard on the RC’s failure to adopt a more active and “operational” stance as 
guarantor of the Constitution. A different opinion was expressed by the Chief of Staff of 
the Air Force, who rejected the possibility that the Council of the Revolution might adopt 
“avant-garde” positions and argued that it couldn’t give opportunity “to any force action 
based on the use of guns”23. Shortly after, the counselors who advocated a more active 
posture of the RC in their quality of guarantor of the Constitution, denounced that in the 
Armed Forces there was a “deeply hostile” climate towards to the military identified with 
the left24.  
This situation was accompanied by a growing chorus of voices from the right wing that 
began to defend the anticipation of the constitutional amendment and the subsequent 
extinction of the RC. In December 1978, in the third Congress of the CDS, this position 
was held by a well known militant of this party, who said that the RC had ceased to be an 
“interim body” and had become a “postponed dead body” and that there were notorious 
evidences of its “absence of life”, even though there were no evidences “of his death”25. 
The following month, to avoid being overtaken by the CDS, Sá Carneiro, who had 
temporally moved away from the leadership of the party who had founded, the PPD-PSD, 
presented a proposal for a constitutional revision. Speaking to the media, Sá Carneiro 
was keen to stress that his proposal for the constitutional revision advocated not only the 
extinction of the RC, but the end of “any political role of the armed forces”, giving as an 
example the case of the appointment of the Chief of General Staff that in its proposal 
would be appointed by the PR but under government proposal26.  
                                                          
22 Minutes of Meeting, 11-1-1978, The Council of the Revolution Archives, Reuniões, Actas, vol. 5, box 6, 
IAN/TT. 
23 Minutes of Meeting, 20-9-1978, The Council of the Revolution Archives, Reuniões, Actas, vol. 6, box 7, 
IAN/TT. 
24 Minutes of Meeting, 29-11-1978, The Council of the Revolution Archives, Reuniões, Actas, vol. 6, box 7, 
IAN/TT. 
25
 Diário de Lisboa, 9-12-1978, p. 10. 
26
 Sá Carneiro’s interview to the program “Dito e feito”, from Portuguese Radio Broadcasting, 22-1-1979. 
Carneiro, Textos, 7, available at www.institutosacarneiro.pt/wp-content/manup/docs/obra/vol_6.pdf 
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Faced with these criticisms, some members of the Council argued that the RC should 
publicize a stand against “the slanderous maneuvers” who intended to affect its 
reputation. However, the disclosure of such statement was not approved by the majority 
of the Council27. At the next meeting, the matter returned to the debate and one of the 
counselors argued that the RC should discuss “a coherent strategy” for its action, 
questioning whether the “progressive erasing” that had been followed should not be 
revised in the light of the general situation of the Portuguese society. Others, referring to 
the political, economic and social developments of the country, said that the RC had not 
achieved, or even attempted, to correct this situation, regretting that the defense of the 
April revolution that was beginning to be criticized both in the civilian and military 
circles was not promoted, “without any complex”28. 
The victory of the coalition of the parties that defended the rapid extinction of the RC, 
in December 1979, aggravated the existing tensions within the Council. These tensions 
manifested themselves, among other occasions, on the controversy between the 
president of the Constitutional Commission and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) 
regarding the role that the RC should play in the political life of the country. If the CSAF 
criticized some RC members because, in its view, unlike the military institution, they 
professed “certain political objectives” and “often” tried to interfere directly or indirectly 
in the events, a situation which led to an “indisputable divorce between part of the RC 
and the military institution”, on the other hand, the president of the CC, argued that the 
Council of the Revolution could not fail to have, under penalty of complete abdication, 
an active participation in the country’s political life, since, according to the Constitution, 
the RC was an eminently political body.  
Following this controversy that continued over several meetings of the RC between 
March and April 1980, the new Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA)29, said during the Army 
Day ceremonies that this branch had not suffered or been affected by the eroded political 
image of the RC, asserting that this image was the result of an “incorrect political 
practice” followed by some elements of the Council. The Chief of Staff also stressed that 
the military should remain exempt and should keep a ‘strict non-partisanship’30.   
                                                          
(accessed August 22, 2015). This proposal was later published under the title, Uma Constituição para os 
anos 80. 
27 Minutes of Meeting, 25-1-1979, The Council of the Revolution Archives, Reuniões, Actas, vol. 7, box 8, 
IAN/TT. 
28 Minutes of Meeting, 31-1-1979, The Council of the Revolution Archives, Reuniões, Actas, vol. 7, box 8, 
IAN/TT. 
29 The previous CEME was removed by the President after a dispute between the army chief and the 
commander of the Lisbon Military Region (LMR) who was also removed from this post. This controversy 
had its origin in the question of the promotion of the commander of the LMR and is an example of the tension 
between the heads of the armed forces and the captains of April 25. Bruneau and Macleod, 1986, 13. 
30 Diário de Lisboa, 26-7-1989, p. 7. 
335 
 
It becomes clear that there was a deep division within the RC regarding the role that 
this sovereign body should play in democratic consolidation. This division put on one 
side the military chiefs, and the “historical” counselors who were carrying these functions 
since the institutionalization of the Armed Forces Movement and the creation of the 
Council31.  
The president’s decision to force the counselors of the revolution to chose between 
staying in the RC or continue to perform command functions in the military structure, 
had consequences in two stages. In the short term those who chose to remain in the 
military commands were replaced in the RC by elements chosen by the branches. On the 
other hand, the counselors who were forced to leave military commands were replaced 
by officers less committed with the revolutionary process. Immediate was also the cut 
between the RC and the military commands, with the exception of the Chiefs of Staff, 
who integrated the Council by inherence, and not vice versa, which meant that 
ultimately, and as they were keen to emphasize on several occasions, they were in the RC 
to represent its branches and not to represent the RC in the branches32. In the medium 
term those who were commanding the military regions would also be replaced by officers 
who had not been directly involved in the creation of the MFA33.   
Contrary to what defended the ‘captains’, the RC adopted a low-profile posture that 
would be constantly criticized by the military who had made the coup.  
Another aspect to take into account is related to the issue of the nominations of senior 
military positions. In the same meeting in which Eanes defended the separation of 
political and military functions, he submitted to the Council two drafts of decree-law on 
this subject. One on the regulation of the form of replacement of the revolutionary 
counselors and the other on the nomination of the military chiefs34. The first attributed 
to the Chiefs of Staff a leading role in the appointment of new RC members, the second 
stipulated that the highest office of the Armed Forces was appointed by the President, 
after he heard the RC, and that the chiefs of the three services of the Armed Forces and 
the vice-Chief of the General Staff, were appointed by the President, on a proposal from 
the CGS, after hearing the RC35. Thus, the President, in addition to reserve for himself, 
in his dual capacity as PR and Chief of the General Staff, the appointment of the 
leadership of the Armed Forces, relegated to a secondary plan the RC, which had only to 
                                                          
31 The existence of division in the military had already been noted by Thomas Bruneau and Alex Macleod, 
1986, 13. However, The Council of the Revolution archives reveal that this division has reached the RC itself 
and has conditioned its action.  
32 For example, statements of the Air Force Chief of Staff at the meeting of July 30, 1980. Minutes of Meeting, 
30-7-1980, The Council of the Revolution Archives, Reuniões, Actas, vol. 8, box 9, IAN/TT. 
33 Rezola, 2007, 366. 
34 Minutes of Meeting, 11-8-1976, The Council of the Revolution Archives, Reuniões, Actas, vol. 3, box 3, 
IAN/TT. 
35 Decree-law nº 668/76 and Decree-law nº 669/76. Diário da República, 1st series, nº 187, August 11, 1976. 
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be heard, and re-established the power of the traditional hierarchy of the Armed Forces 
over the RC, which until them was the main organ in the process of selection and 
appointment of military chiefs. The power which from that time stood concentrated in 
the President, was exercised shortly after (new appointments of military chiefs). 
Other useful indicators of the little interventionist stance of the RC are found when 
we analyze the promotions and the legislative activity of the Council. In relation to 
promotions to general officer, of the two hundred seventy-five proposals, only four had 
their origin in the Council and of these two hundred seventy-one that came from the 
branches, only eight were rejected by the RC. Regarding the legislative process, it turns 
out that the preparation of draft legislation was mostly made in the General Staffs and 
then it was approved by the Council. On the other hand, the Military Chiefs also had 
extensive legislative powers that allowed them to publish ordinances that had not to go 
through the RC36. 
 
Conclusion 
After the presidential election of 1976, the RC gradually lost its revolutionary features. 
Despite the wide powers granted to it by the Constitution, the Council adopted a low 
interventionist stance. Only in the name the RC remain revolutionary. This was not 
insignificant. Its mere existence has served as an escape for many tensions that still 
existed within the Armed Forces. The anticipation of the extinction of the Council, 
advocated by some political leaders, would probably provoke a strong reaction with 
unpredictable consequences, by those who advocated a more active role of the RC. 
As in Spain, where the existence of division in the military was an important element 
in the success of the democratic transition37, in Portugal the existence of differences 
among the military was also crucial. However, in the Portuguese case, the role played by 
the military in overthrowing the former authoritarian regime, in the decolonization and 
during the revolutionary process put them in a central position, unparalleled in other 
cases of successful transitions. This centrality made more difficult the withdrawal of the 
military. This division, which as stressed by Felipe Aguero, did not exist in South 
American transitions38, allowed that the President played a major role in the preparation 
of the military subordination to the civilian. 
Therefore, the long process of democratic consolidation in Portugal should not be 
interpreted as a confrontation between civilians, desirous to put an end to military 
tutelage, and the military, who sought to keep their privileges at all costs, nor as a gradual 
                                                          
36 Ferreira, 1986, 234-237 
37 Aguero, 2000, 67. 
38 Aguero, 1995, 144. 
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process in which civil and military shared a common goal. The dividing line should be 
placed between those who defended the maintenance of the status quo, and the 
supporters of the military subordination to the civil power. Either on one side or the other 
there were civilian and military. Thus, this case confirms the validity of the model of 
‘shared responsibility’ proposed by Douglas Bland. This author suggested “that military 
also shares responsibility for controlling the armed forces in the interest of the principle 
of civil control”, and argues that “if senior officers and commanders value civil control 
and the rule of law (…) then they will act to protect the civil authority by attacking civilian 
insurrections, controlling their units, restricting political activity in garrisons, and 
punishing officers who attempt to overthrow governments”39. That´s what happened in 
Portugal in the post-revolutionary period. If we do not analyze the role of the military as 
partners in this process, we can’t explain its success. This case shows how, paradoxically, 
the subordination to the civil power can receive an important contribution of the military 
who wish to remove politics from the barracks.   
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This publication presents the Proceedings of the 38th Annual Conference of ACIS - Association for 
Contemporary Iberian Studies, held from 7th to 9th September 2016 at the Universidade Católica Por-
tuguesa, in Porto in collaboration with the University of East Anglia and University of Westminster.
Under the theme “Iberian Interconnections”, this edition gathers papers and panels which explore 
a wide range of Iberian themes and also expand the scope of the intra-Iberian geographical bound-
aries to other latitudes, focusing on Luso-Spanish interconnections and the numerous bridges to 
the wider Lusophone and Hispanic worlds in the linguistic, literary, cultural, artistic, social-historical, 
economic and political domains, including rich and multifaceted studies on multiculturalism, mem-
ory, representation and identity, tourism and propaganda, media, migration, dictatorial and demo-
cratic regimes, gender in cinema and the mining industry.
Esta publicación recoge las actas del 38º Congreso Anual de ACIS - Asociación de Estudios Ibéricos 
Contemporáneos -  que tuvo lugar entre el 7 y el 9 de septiembre de 2016, en el Centro Regional de 
Oporto de la Universidad Católica Portuguesa, en colaboración con la Universidad de East Anglia y la 
Universidad de Westminster.
Con el título “Las interconexiones ibéricas”, esta edición reúne trabajos y paneles que exploran una 
amplia variedad de temas ibéricos, y extiende las fronteras geográficas intraibéricas a otras latitu-
des, centrándose en las interconexiones luso-españolas y los numerosos puentes para el mundo 
lusófono e hispánico en los dominios lingüístico, literario, cultural, artístico, histórico, social, econó-
mico y político, lo que incluye un rico y multifacético conjunto de estudios sobre el multiculturalismo, 
la memoria, la representación y la identidad, el turismo y la propaganda, los medios de comunicación, 
la emigración, los regímenes dictatoriales y democráticos, el género en el cine o la industria minera. 
A presente publicação reúne as atas do 38º Congresso anual da ACIS - Association for Contempo-
rary Iberian Studies que se realizou, entre os dias 7 e 9 de setembro de 2016, no Centro Regional do 
Porto da Universidade Católica Portuguesa com a parceria da Universidade de East Anglia e a Uni-
versidade de Westminster.
Intitulada “Iberian Interconnections” esta edição reúne trabalhos e painéis que exploram uma larga 
variedade de temas ibéricos e amplia os limites geográficos intraibéricos a outras latitudes, incidindo 
sobre as interconexões luso-espanholas e as inúmeras pontes para o mundo lusófono e hispânico 
nos domínios linguístico, literário, cultural, artístico, histórico-social, económico e político, incluindo 
um rico e multifacetado conjunto de estudos sobre o multiculturalismo, a memória, representação 
e identidade, turismo e propaganda, os media, a emigração, os regimes ditatoriais e democráticos, o 
género no cinema ou a indústria mineira. 
